Here we go Again! :-(

J

Jeffrey A. Setaro

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

- - -----------------------------------------------------------------
Title: Buffer Overrun In RPCSS Service Could Allow Code
Execution (824146)
Date: September 10, 2003
Software: Microsoft Windows NT Workstation 4.0
Microsoft Windows NT Server(r) 4.0
Microsoft Windows NT Server 4.0, Terminal Server
Edition
Microsoft Windows 2000
Microsoft Windows XP
Microsoft Windows Server 2003
Impact: Run code of attacker's choice
Max Risk: Critical
Bulletin: MS03-039

Microsoft encourages customers to review the Security Bulletins
at:

http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS03-039.asp
http://www.microsoft.com/security/security_bulletins/MS03-039.asp

- - -----------------------------------------------------------------

Issue:
======

The fix provided by this patch supersedes the one included in
Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-026.

Remote Procedure Call (RPC) is a protocol used by the Windows
operating system. RPC provides an inter-process communication
mechanism that allows a program running on one computer to
seamlessly access services on another computer. The protocol
itself is derived from the Open Software Foundation (OSF) RPC
protocol, but with the addition of some Microsoft specific
extensions.

There are three identified vulnerabilities in the part of RPCSS
Service that deals with RPC messages for DCOM activation- two
that could allow arbitrary code execution and one that could
result in a denial of service. The flaws result from incorrect
handling of malformed messages. These particular vulnerabilities
affect the Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) interface
within the RPCSS Service. This interface handles DCOM object
activation requests that are sent from one machine to another.

An attacker who successfully exploited these vulnerabilities
could be able to run code with Local System privileges on an
affected system, or could cause the RPCSS Service to fail. The
attacker could then be able to take any action on the system,
including installing programs, viewing, changing or deleting
data, or creating new accounts with full privileges.

To exploit these vulnerabilities, an attacker could create a
program to send a malformed RPC message to a vulnerable system
targeting the RPCSS Service.

Microsoft has released a tool that can be used to scan a network
for the presence of systems which have not had the MS03-039 patch
installed. More details on this tool are available in Microsoft
Knowledge Base article 827363. This tool supersedes the one
provided in Microsoft Knowledge Base article 826369. If the tool
provided in Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 826369 is used
against a system which has installed the security patch provided
with this bulletin, the superseded tool will incorrectly report
that the system is missing the patch provided in MS03-026.
Microsoft encourages customers to run the latest version of the
tool available in Microsoft Knowledge Base article 827363 to
determine if their systems are patched.


Mitigating Factors:
====================
- Firewall best practices and standard default firewall
configurations can help protect networks from remote attacks
originating outside of the enterprise perimeter. Best practices
recommend blocking all ports that are not actually being used.
For this reason, most systems attached to the Internet should
have a minimal number of the affected ports exposed.

Risk Rating:
============
- Critical

Patch Availability:
===================
- A patch is available to fix this vulnerability. Please read
the Security Bulletins at

http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS03-039.asp
http://www.microsoft.com/security/security_bulletins/MS03-039.asp

for information on obtaining this patch.

Acknowledgment:
===============
- eEye Digital Security (http://www.eeye.com/html)
- NSFOCUS Security Team (http://www.nsfocus.com)
- Xue Yong Zhi and Renaud Deraison from Tenable Network Security
(http://www.tenablesecurity.com)

for reporting the buffer overrun vulnerabilities and working with
us to protect customers.
- - -----------------------------------------------------------------

THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE MICROSOFT KNOWLEDGE BASE IS
PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. MICROSOFT
DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
PURPOSE. IN NO EVENT SHALL MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS SUPPLIERS
BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER INCLUDING DIRECT, INDIRECT,
INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, LOSS OF BUSINESS PROFITS OR SPECIAL
DAMAGES, EVEN IF MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS SUPPLIERS HAVE BEEN
ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. SOME STATES DO NOT
ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR CONSEQUENTIAL
OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES SO THE FOREGOING LIMITATION MAY NOT APPLY.


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*******************************************************************

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--
Cheers-

Jeff Setaro
(e-mail address removed)
http://people.mags.net/jasetaro/
PGP Key IDs DH/DSS: 0x5D41429D RSA: 0x599D2A99 New RSA: 0xA19EBD34
 
A

Axel Pettinger

Jeffrey A. Setaro said:
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

- - -----------------------------------------------------------------
Title: Buffer Overrun In RPCSS Service Could Allow Code
Execution (824146)
Date: September 10, 2003
Software: Microsoft Windows NT Workstation 4.0
Microsoft Windows NT Server(r) 4.0
Microsoft Windows NT Server 4.0, Terminal Server
Edition
Microsoft Windows 2000
Microsoft Windows XP
Microsoft Windows Server 2003
Impact: Run code of attacker's choice
Max Risk: Critical
Bulletin: MS03-039

Microsoft encourages customers to review the Security Bulletins
at:

http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS03-039.asp
http://www.microsoft.com/security/security_bulletins/MS03-039.asp

- - -----------------------------------------------------------------

And just to make that clear ... MS03-039 replaces MS03-026 ("Lovsan
patch"). People who installed the MS03-026 patch should *definitely*
install this new patch - it's *not* just a minor update ...

Regards,
Axel Pettinger
 
D

David H. Lipman

MS has also updated the RPC scanner to include the RPCSS vulnerability. I used it today and
it will identify if a PC has neither, one or both patches installed.

Dave

| "Jeffrey A. Setaro" wrote:
| >
| > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
| >
| > - - -----------------------------------------------------------------
| > Title: Buffer Overrun In RPCSS Service Could Allow Code
| > Execution (824146)
| > Date: September 10, 2003
| > Software: Microsoft Windows NT Workstation 4.0
| > Microsoft Windows NT Server(r) 4.0
| > Microsoft Windows NT Server 4.0, Terminal Server
| > Edition
| > Microsoft Windows 2000
| > Microsoft Windows XP
| > Microsoft Windows Server 2003
| > Impact: Run code of attacker's choice
| > Max Risk: Critical
| > Bulletin: MS03-039
| >
| > Microsoft encourages customers to review the Security Bulletins
| > at:
| >
| > http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS03-039.asp
| > http://www.microsoft.com/security/security_bulletins/MS03-039.asp
| >
| > - - -----------------------------------------------------------------
|
| And just to make that clear ... MS03-039 replaces MS03-026 ("Lovsan
| patch"). People who installed the MS03-026 patch should *definitely*
| install this new patch - it's *not* just a minor update ...
|
| Regards,
| Axel Pettinger
 
S

Sugien

David H. Lipman said:
MS has also updated the RPC scanner to include the RPCSS vulnerability. I used it today and
it will identify if a PC has neither, one or both patches installed.

Dave

| "Jeffrey A. Setaro" wrote:
| >
| > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
| >
| > - - -----------------------------------------------------------------
| > Title: Buffer Overrun In RPCSS Service Could Allow Code
| > Execution (824146)
| > Date: September 10, 2003
| > Software: Microsoft Windows NT Workstation 4.0
| > Microsoft Windows NT Server(r) 4.0
| > Microsoft Windows NT Server 4.0, Terminal Server
| > Edition
| > Microsoft Windows 2000
| > Microsoft Windows XP
| > Microsoft Windows Server 2003
| > Impact: Run code of attacker's choice
| > Max Risk: Critical
| > Bulletin: MS03-039
| >
| > Microsoft encourages customers to review the Security Bulletins
| > at:
| >
| > http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS03-039.asp
| > http://www.microsoft.com/security/security_bulletins/MS03-039.asp
| >
| > - - -----------------------------------------------------------------
|
| And just to make that clear ... MS03-039 replaces MS03-026 ("Lovsan
| patch"). People who installed the MS03-026 patch should *definitely*
| install this new patch - it's *not* just a minor update ...
|
| Regards,
| Axel Pettinger


I wonder if any skiddies are trying to figure out if they can use the tool
M$ provided:
Microsoft has released a tool that can be used to scan a network
for the presence of systems which have not had the MS03-039 patch
installed

seeing as how "MS has also updated the RPC scanner to include the RPCSS
vulnerability" and that "it will identify if a PC has neither, one or both
patches installed." the skiddies my be scratching their pointy little heads
and trying to figure out a way to integrate the *tool* M$ so thoughtfully
provided into some sort of exploit tool so that the exploit the skiddie
creates can scan for systems that are open and venerable to the attack.
That way the exploit can concentrate on those systems that are open to the
exploit.
I guess it is like just about every other security tool, it depends on
who is using it for what reason as to whether or not it is a good security
tool to help secure a system, or a tool used to either expedite the
penetration of a system or to help accomplish the penetration. It is sort
of like the old gun analogy in as much that you can place a firearm in the
hands of a trained hunter (security professional) and they can provide
needed food (securing a system). However placing the same firearm in the
hands of a chimpanzee (a skiddie) could result in the animal not only
harming it's self (opening their own system up to other skiddies)but also
anyone within the firearms range (anyone's system with an active Internet
connection).
 
B

Bill Baird

The fix provided by this patch supersedes the one included in
Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-026.

Jeezus H. Frapping Kerist. We just 600 machines patched, or at least
checked to make sure. Now there is another emergency for the umteenth
time this year???? To fix the patch for the fix for the patch...!!!!!

Has anybody on this group got any experience with taking an NT/XP network
back to Dos 3.3, say maybe with baseband and Novell ne2000 drivers? Or
maybe CP/M and ArcNet? Why didn't we give OS/2 some more encouragement
when we had the chance?

Crappola!!!

BB
 
N

null

Jeezus H. Frapping Kerist. We just 600 machines patched, or at least
checked to make sure. Now there is another emergency for the umteenth
time this year???? To fix the patch for the fix for the patch...!!!!!

Has anybody on this group got any experience with taking an NT/XP network
back to Dos 3.3, say maybe with baseband and Novell ne2000 drivers? Or
maybe CP/M and ArcNet? Why didn't we give OS/2 some more encouragement
when we had the chance?

Crappola!!!

Crappola indeed. The author of Blaster said it all about Billy Gates.


Art
http://www.epix.net/~artnpeg
 
H

Herman Mann

Microsoft encourages customers to review the Security Bulletins at:
You know, I have searched MS's knowledge base high and low but can't seem
to find the answer for when the VP of Operations corners you in the hall,
waves his overtime reports in your face and asks "What Again? How many
Goddammed times are you guys going to do this??!!"

Really helps on the ole resume to have "Fired for using MS products." I
knew I should have gone into the shoe business with my Uncle. Hell, even
Al Bundy didn't have to put up with this shit.

Herm
ChiTown Bandit. Certified in practically everything that Redmond ever
wrote, but please don't tell anyone.
 
D

David H. Lipman

Do what I do -- push the update through the NT Domain Login Script (or SMS or SUS) before
there is a Exploit.

Dave

|
|
| > Microsoft encourages customers to review the Security Bulletins at:
| >
| >
| You know, I have searched MS's knowledge base high and low but can't seem
| to find the answer for when the VP of Operations corners you in the hall,
| waves his overtime reports in your face and asks "What Again? How many
| Goddammed times are you guys going to do this??!!"
|
| Really helps on the ole resume to have "Fired for using MS products." I
| knew I should have gone into the shoe business with my Uncle. Hell, even
| Al Bundy didn't have to put up with this shit.
|
| Herm
| ChiTown Bandit. Certified in practically everything that Redmond ever
| wrote, but please don't tell anyone.
 
J

Jim Inacker

MS has also updated the RPC scanner to include the RPCSS vulnerability. I used
it today and
it will identify if a PC has neither, one or both patches installed.
I also setup and ran the scanner today, but was disappointed to discover that
using the /v verbose and /l logging switches did not generate a verbose log.
Any one have a clue on how to generate a verbose log?
Also can anyone explain how the /24 mask enables scanning of xxx.xxx.xxx.1 to
xxx.xxx.xxx.255?

Thanks
 
H

Herman Mann

Do what I do -- push the update through the NT Domain Login Script (or
SMS or SUS) before there is a Exploit.

Dave

Yeah, we usually do, but our last major push didn't push. It shoved it up
and I wont say where or to who but it hurt. We have so damn many different
configurations that we just flat don't trust the pushes. (the last IT head
bought stuff that he wanted to play with, not necessarily stuff that the
company could put to best use.)

Herm
 
S

SND

Jeezus H. Frapping Kerist. We just 600 machines patched, or at least
checked to make sure. Now there is another emergency for the umteenth
time this year???? To fix the patch for the fix for the patch...!!!!!

Time to look into a management console. With 600 machines, it is rediculous
to be walking around to each machine to install patches.
 
J

Jason Spashett

Maybe they should delete all their code and start again. Maybe we can lobby
for a court ruling on that :p
 
R

Robert R Kircher, Jr.

Bill Baird said:
Jeezus H. Frapping Kerist. We just 600 machines patched, or at least
checked to make sure. Now there is another emergency for the umteenth
time this year???? To fix the patch for the fix for the patch...!!!!!

Has anybody on this group got any experience with taking an NT/XP network
back to Dos 3.3, say maybe with baseband and Novell ne2000 drivers? Or
maybe CP/M and ArcNet? Why didn't we give OS/2 some more encouragement
when we had the chance?


You should look into SUS.
http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/windowsupdate/sus/default.asp

I use it on several networks now and it's working great. Nice thing is I
can sit here at home and when the notices come in from MS, I just Terminal
Server into a handful of networks, sync SUS and approve the update.
Sometime around 3 am all the clients were updated. I'll verify the install
sometime this morning but it hasn't let me down yet. Of course this
depends on the client being left on but SUS also has provisions for missed
update events so even if the PC was off last night it will update as soon as
the PC is booted.
 
R

Robert R Kircher, Jr.

Nick FitzGerald said:
You are, I presume, aware of the serious flaws in the way SUS works,
given it is based on the chronically suspect Windows Update mechanisms?

I assume you can point to non biased documentation of these flaws?

It works well for me. And it sure as shit is better then hand patching 600
PCs.
 
E

Ed >:-)

On Wed, 10 Sep 2003 15:27:35 -0400, Jeffrey A. Setaro

The protocol
itself is derived from the Open Software Foundation (OSF) RPC
protocol, but with the addition of some Microsoft specific
extensions.

So they took it from an open source then right?
There are three identified vulnerabilities in the part of RPCSS
Service that deals with RPC messages for DCOM activation- two
that could allow arbitrary code execution and one that could
result in a denial of service. The flaws result from incorrect
handling of malformed messages. These particular vulnerabilities
affect the Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) interface
within the RPCSS Service. This interface handles DCOM object
activation requests that are sent from one machine to another.

Added M$ shit to it and screwed it up.....
 
R

Robert R Kircher, Jr.

Jason Spashett said:
...
...

One might like to look at
news://news.microsoft.com/microsoft.public.security and decide if slight
anxiety is appropriate.

It might be sensible to try patches on a few machines first.



Exactly why SUS can be very handy. You have the opportunity to install and
test the patch prior to approving it for general release.
 
R

Robert R Kircher, Jr.

Jeffrey A. Setaro said:
I assume you can point to non biased documentation of these flaws?

[Snip]

See "Windows Update Patch Process Faulty, Expert Says" By JAIKUMAR
VIJAYAN, Computerworld, AUGUST 18, 2003.

<http://www.computerworld.com/printthis/2003/0,4814,84084,00.html>


I did some pretty thorough testing before settling on it. Had it installed
for a few months on a pilot network running 3 servers and 15 Win2K sp3&4 and
XP Pro clients. Note: I don't use it to do server updates. During this
time the network used SUS exclusively and all the workstations were updated
properly (Yes they were checked). I have not seed this particular issue
since implementing SUS, and I have seen PC loose connection during the
update process. When the system regains connection and the next scheduled
update is run, the patches pick up form the ones that failed.

I certainly wouldn't be foolish enough to say it's flawless; I can only
report that it has worked well for me.
 

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