JAD said:
I myself have tested its effectivness.
Out of curiosity, how? Not that it would mean someone else couldn't invent
a better attack than you've currently thought of.
The biggest part of 'security' is NOT
letting the machine get infected in the first place, no?
That is precisely the point.
Security is not
defined by letting something infect a machine, then trying to get rid of it,
nor is it just the ability to detect viruses already in operation. I'm not
sure of where your coming from.
I'm coming from precisely the summary you just made and then applying it to
your comment that nothing gets 'out' of your firewall.
That suggests a robustness, and level of 'protection', that you simply
can't know because you're correctly doing the kind of security you just
explained: things don't get in. Which means you can't know if there's
something out there that could compromise the firewall's outbound block
because they don't get in to try and you certainly can't know every trick
someone has, or will, invent so you can't even 'simulate' the unknown type
of attack.
What I'm concerned with is the exaggerated emphasis it seems some people
place on 'outbound' in a 'security' context when, as you put quite well,
"Security is not defined by letting something infect a machine." It can,
perhaps, help mitigate but that is like trying to get passengers onto a
couple of lifeboats after you struck the iceberg and it's a 'security'
overstatement to think that lifeboats 'keep the ship afloat'. You do that
by not letting the iceberg in.